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I. Introduction 
onetary policy operating procedures have long been
 debated within the Federal Reserve and among 
monetary economists at large. For instance, economists have 
disagreed about whether a central bank should utilize bank 
reserves or the interest rate as the policy instrument. For the 
time being at least, the Fed has settled on an interest rate policy 
instrument and has announced its current federal funds rate 
target since 1994. The focus on interest rate policy is reflected 
in the ubiquitous use of the Taylor rule in monetary policy 
analysis. 
Oddly enough, just as the longstanding debate over bank 
reserves and the federal funds rate was set aside, four 
developments combined to renew an interest in operating 
procedures. First, economists began to worry that 
technological progress in the payments system could threaten a 
central bank’s leverage over interest rates in the future.1 
Second, deflation in Japan led to a zero interest rate policy that 
stimulated a reconsideration of the nature of monetary policy 
transmission. Third, Congress considered legislation that 
would empower the Fed to pay explicit interest on bank 
reserves.2 Fourth, during the 1980s and 1990s, many of the 
world’s central banks moved from credit controls to market-
based procedures for implementing monetary policy. Today, 
the world’s major central banks implement monetary policy by 
manipulating short-term interest rates. Yet important 
differences remain in the procedures by which short-term rates 
are managed. There is considerable interest in comparing 
alternatives currently in use and in exploring new procedures 
that might afford benefits in the future.3 
Motivated by these four developments, this paper highlights 
the role of interest on reserves in understanding the leverage 
that central banks exert over interest rates and explores the 
potential for interest on reserves to improve the 
implementation of monetary policy. I find that interest on 
reserves can and should be employed as a policy instrument 
equal in importance with open market operations. In effect, my 
paper resolves the historical dispute over bank reserves and 
interest rate operating procedures by pointing out how a 
central bank can target both independently. I conclude that a 
central bank without the authority to pay and vary interest on 
reserves at a market rate is at a considerable disadvantage in the 
implementation of monetary policy. 
Economists, most notably Friedman (1959), have long 
advocated the payment of interest on reserves at a market rate 
in order to eliminate the distortions associated with the tax on 
reserves.4 To a large extent, the legislation mentioned above 
was introduced to address the reserve tax. I am proposing 
something more: that interest on reserves be adopted as an 
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instrument of monetary policy in practice.5 Some economists 
have argued that paying interest on reserves might actually 
impair the ability of a central bank to conduct monetary 
policy.6 More recently, however, interest rate rules for 
monetary policy have been shown to deliver coherent 
outcomes for the price level and real variables, even in models 
that ignore the demand for reserves and money completely.7 
These latest findings imply that interest rate rules could achieve 
broader macroeconomic objectives in much the same way, 
whether or not interest is paid on reserves. 
I build up the analytical core of the paper in Section II by 
reviewing the nature of the zero bound on nominal interest 
rates. I explain that a central bank can manipulate short-term 
interest rates either by employing open market operations to 
manage the interest opportunity cost of holding reserves or by 
varying the interest paid on reserves. I then explain how a 
central bank could employ interest on reserves together with 
open market operations to target independently and 
productively both short-term interest rates and the aggregate 
quantity of bank reserves. 
Section III employs the reasoning developed above to 
address the viability of interest rate policy in the event that 
technological progress in the payments system causes the 
transaction demand for bank reserves and currency to shrink 
significantly and even to disappear completely. Such 
developments will indeed threaten the Fed’s leverage over 
interest rates if the central bank persists in using its current 
operating procedures. However, a central bank’s leverage over 
interest rates can be preserved fully by employing interest on 
reserves as a monetary policy instrument. 
The financing of interest on reserves is considered in 
Section IV. Paying a market rate of interest on reserves could 
very well increase net interest transfers from the central bank to 
the Treasury. At worst, it would have a relatively small adverse 
effect on government finances. Interest on reserves could create 
cash flow problems for monetary policy on occasion, but these 
would be manageable. 
II. The Interest-on-Reserves Regime 
The means by which the Federal Reserve sets the level of the 
federal funds rate at a point in time is well known. In current 
practice, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
announces a target for the federal funds rate and instructs the 
trading desk at the New York Fed to use open market 
operations to provide the quantity of reserves and currency 
that the economy demands at that federal funds rate. The 
quantity of monetary base demanded adjusts so that the 
implicit marginal liquidity services yield exactly matches the 
interest opportunity cost spread, that is, the federal funds rate 
target minus the (zero) interest rate on reserves. 
I came to view the process by which a central bank manages 
the interbank rate in a different light a few years ago in a paper 
on the zero bound on interest rate policy.8 Obviously, at the 
zero bound it is no longer possible for a central bank to operate 
on the interest opportunity cost spread. The spread is zero. 
Nevertheless, a central bank still may be said to manage the 
interbank rate when it is zero. Thus, something other than 
open market operations and the interest opportunity cost 
spread must matter for the implementation of interest rate 
policy. 
Irving Fisher developed the fundamental logic of the lower 
bound on interest rates in his famous book The Theory of 
Interest. He pointed out that if a commodity could be stored 
costlessly over time, then the rate of interest in units of that 
commodity could never fall below zero.9 Surprisingly, as far as 
I know, Fisher did not apply that reasoning to monetary issues. 
In my paper, I applied Fisher’s logic to point out that banks will 
never lend reserves to each other at negative (nominal) interest 
if reserve deposits are costless to store (carry) at the central 
bank. The zero bound on the nominal interbank rate is a 
consequence of the fact that a central bank stores bank reserves 
for free. 
Thinking about the zero bound this way suggests that 
variable interest on reserves could be utilized routinely and 
productively as an instrument of monetary policy. The Fed 
could replace its current operating procedures with a new 
interest-on-reserves regime. For heuristic purposes, I describe 
the implementation of the new regime in two steps, although 
the steps would take place simultaneously in practice. First, the 
Fed would purchase additional securities in the open market, 
adding enough reserves to satiate the market and drive the 
federal funds rate to zero. The Bank of Japan actually 
implemented this step recently with its zero interest rate policy. 
Second, the Fed would begin to pay interest on bank reserves 
held on deposit at the Federal Reserve Banks. If the current 
intended target for the overnight rate were, say, 5 percent, then 
the Fed would pay interest on reserves at 5 percent. 
It is easy to see why the rate of interest paid on reserves 
would determine the overnight market rate in this regime. 
Clearly, by Fisher’s logic the 5 percent interest rate paid on 
reserves would put a 5 percent floor under which banks would 
not lend reserves to each other. The 5 percent floor would also 
be a ceiling above which banks would not lend to each other 
either. The reason is that there could be no interest opportunity 
cost spread in equilibrium if the reserve market is satiated so 
that the marginal liquidity services yield on reserves is zero. 
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central bank would continue to accommodate the demand for 
currency as the Fed does today. 
Thus, the interest-on-reserves regime would enable the Fed 
to exercise control of the overnight interest rate exactly as it 
does now. The main business of the FOMC would be to choose 
the interest rate paid on reserves, which would govern the level 
of short-term rates more generally as the federal funds rate 
target does today under the Fed’s current operating 
procedures. 
However, the interest-on-reserves regime would differ from 
the Fed’s current operating procedures in one important 
respect. Open market operations would cease to support the 
interbank rate in the new regime. Open market operations 
would support neither the interest opportunity cost spread 
(which would be zero) nor the level of the interbank rate 
(which would be determined by the rate of interest paid on 
reserve balances at the central bank). Therefore, open market 
operations would be free to pursue another monetary policy 
objective. 
Specifically, a central bank would be free to target any 
aggregate quantity of reserves above the minimum required to 
keep the interbank rate at the interest-on-reserves floor. This 
point is illustrated in the exhibit. The kink in the reserve 
demand locus reflects the fact that the quantity of reserves 
demanded rises as the market interest rate falls and becomes 
infinitely elastic when the market interest rate hits the rate paid 
on reserves. Reserve supply is vertical at the aggregate quantity 
of reserves supplied by the central bank. As long as the supply 
of reserves is large enough to cut the horizontal portion of the 
reserve demand locus, the central bank could use open market 
operations to target bank reserves, and independently use 
interest on reserves to pursue interest rate policy. 
This opens an important new possibility for monetary 
policy: separate interest rate and bank reserves channels of 
monetary policy transmission. My zero-bound paper 
(Goodfriend 2000) explains how (negative) interest on reserves 
and reserve targeting could play independent and 
complementary roles in overcoming the zero bound on interest 
rates. In the paper, I pointed to the potential for quantitative 
policy to operate productively on broad liquidity even if narrow 
liquidity were satiated with the interbank rate at the interest-
on-reserves floor. It is noteworthy that currently the Bank of 
Japan is considering supplementing its zero interest rate policy 
with quantitative easing. Most monetary economists agree that 
aggressive open market purchases in Japan could stimulate 
aggregate demand even with short rates immobilized at zero. 
Such logic suggests that the independent use of quantitative 
policy made possible in an interest-on-reserves regime could be 
of considerable value even when the interest rate is not 
immobilized at the zero bound. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a model of the 
separate interest rate and bank reserves channels of monetary 
transmission in an interest-on-reserves regime. However, one 
can understand the potential usefulness of the additional 
degree of monetary policy freedom as follows. Narrow liquidity 
services provided by the monetary base enable banks and the 
public to economize on time and effort in settling transactions. 
Broad liquidity, however, is a service yield provided by assets 
more generally according to how easily they can be turned into 
cash, either by sale or by serving as collateral for external 
finance. Households and firms are routinely subjected to 
liquidity shocks in which the flow of current income is 
insufficient to finance desired expenditures. Broad liquidity 
services are valued because they minimize the exposure of 
households and firms to the external finance premium.10 
In the interest-on-reserves regime, bank reserves would pay 
a market rate of interest but would yield no narrow liquidity 
services at the margin. Hence, in such a regime, bank reserves 
would be equivalent to safe government debt with a floating 
daily rate of interest. However, bank reserves would continue 
to provide broad liquidity services at the margin in an interest-
on-reserves regime, much as short-term government debt 
does. Holding interest on reserves fixed, an increase in bank 
reserves would increase the aggregate supply of broad liquidity. 
Thus, open market operations would have the potential to 
manage productively the aggregate quantity of broad liquidity 
in the economy independently of interest rate policy. A central 
bank could increase broad liquidity in the economy by using 
newly created reserves to acquire less liquid assets or by 
financing a temporary government budget deficit. 
Why might a central bank value the latitude to pursue 
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policy could continue to be utilized to maintain overall 
macroeconomic stability. Bank reserves policy could then 
address financial market objectives. In the long run, a central 
bank could pursue an objective for bank reserves to optimize 
the broad liquidity services provided by the floating stock of 
government debt.11 In the short run, for example, a central 
bank could increase bank reserves in response to a negative 
shock to broad liquidity in banking or securities markets or an 
increase in the external finance premium that elevated spreads 
in credit markets. The increase in bank reserves would help to 
stabilize financial markets by offsetting the temporary 
reduction in the private supply of broad liquidity. The latitude 
to pursue bank reserves policy and interest rate policy 
separately would be useful to the extent that shocks in financial 
markets and the macroeconomy are somewhat independent of 
each other. 
Recent experience illustrates this point. Consider the fact 
that the Fed cut interest rates sharply in response to two of the 
most serious financial crises in recent years: the October 1987 
stock market break and the turmoil following the Russian 
default in 1998. Arguably, in retrospect, interest rate policy 
remained too easy for too long in both cases. The latitude to 
increase bank reserves independently of interest rate policy 
conceivably could have enabled the Fed to stabilize financial 
markets in those cases with less risk of stimulating the overall 
economy excessively. 
To some degree, the Fed can already manage broad liquidity 
under current operating procedures by changing the 
composition of its assets, for example, by selling liquid short-
term Treasury securities and acquiring less liquid longer term 
securities. However, the government debt injected into the 
economy in this way would not be as liquid as newly created 
base money. More importantly, the Fed’s ability to affect broad 
liquidity in this way is strictly limited by the size of its balance 
sheet. For the broad liquidity management contemplated here 
to be effective, a central bank might need the latitude to enlarge 
its balance sheet considerably and to vary the size of its balance 
sheet within a wide range independently of interest rate policy. 
That is not possible under the Fed’s current operating 
procedures. 
Monetary economists have long accepted the view that a 
central bank must choose between an interest rate instrument 
and a bank reserves policy instrument. Bank reserves and the 
interest rate, it is said, cannot be targeted independently.12 The 
conventional view is misleading because it ignores the fact that 
interest on reserves at a central bank can be employed 
productively as a policy instrument. The fact that some central 
banks, including the Fed, have not yet been authorized to pay 
and vary interest on reserves should not cloud our 
understanding of the potential role of interest on reserves in 
implementing monetary policy. Nor should it preclude one’s 
investigation of the benefits that full exploitation of the 
interest-on-reserves regime could achieve. 
III. The Robustness of a Central 
Bank’s Leverage over Interest 
Rates
In this section, I use the above framework to assess the 
robustness of a central bank’s leverage over interest rates in a 
world where the transaction demand for bank reserves and 
even currency shrinks significantly and perhaps disappears 
completely. Is a central bank’s leverage over interest rates 
threatened by banks’ ongoing economization on reserves? The 
short answer is it need not be. My answer has four parts. 
First, it is worth remembering that the reduction in reserve 
demand is in large part the result of the failure of reserves to pay 
interest. The incentive to economize on reserves was greater 
when inflation made nominal interest rates much higher than 
they are today. But even at current interest rates, banks 
continue to find ways to avoid holding reserves.13 A falling 
demand for reserves is far from inevitable if the opportunity 
cost of holding reserve balances at a central bank is reduced by 
achieving price stability or by paying interest on reserves.
Second, we saw above that in general, a central bank need 
not maintain an opportunity cost of reserves in order to 
implement interest rate policy. A central bank could push the 
market rate down to the interest-on-reserves floor and vary 
interest on reserves to implement interest rate policy as 
described in Section II. With no opportunity cost of holding 
reserve deposits, there would be no incentive for banks to pay 
anything to economize on reserve balances. The 
demonetization of the reserve market would likely slow or stop, 
and reverse if reserve avoidance has an ongoing cost. 
Third, an extremely small, unstable aggregate demand for 
reserves could create a problem for the Fed’s current 
procedures. Today, the Fed defends its announced funds rate 
target with relatively infrequent interventions in the reserves 
market. Movements in the funds rate could become erratic if 
reserve demand shrinks further. The Fed might feel compelled 
to intervene more often. More frequent interventions, 
however, would tend to weaken market forces that would 
otherwise stabilize the funds rate around the Fed’s intended 
target. The Fed could be drawn into a more or less continuous 
defense of a narrow band around its intended federal funds 
rate. In so doing, the Fed would end up inserting itself between 
trades to redistribute reserves among banks. That outcome 
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funds market actively in the current environment, where 
reserves are costly to hold. 
Contrast that possibility with what would happen in the 
interest-on-reserves regime. The central bank would control 
the overnight interest rate tightly with its interest-on-reserves 
policy instrument without any opportunity cost of reserves. 
Banks would continue to transfer reserve deposits among 
themselves to settle payment orders initiated by their 
depositors. However, banks would greatly enlarge their 
inventory of reserves, stockouts would be infrequent, and 
banks would redistribute reserves among themselves much less 
often via the interbank credit market. The overnight interbank 
market might become less active or disappear altogether, but 
only because banks had a more economical way to manage 
their reserves in an interest-on-reserves regime. 
For our last look into the future, we consider what would 
happen if technological progress in the payments system 
caused the monetary base to lose its medium-of-exchange role 
gradually, and to completely lose that role eventually. This 
could happen if the banking system developed an electronic 
settlement system independent of the central bank, and 
currency was abandoned in favor of electronic devices that 
could access bank deposits remotely.14 
Clearly, interest rate policy implemented by the Fed’s 
current operating procedures could not survive in this case. If 
the Fed persisted in implementing interest rate policy with its 
current procedures, the Fed would continually sell securities to 
withdraw reserves and currency. Reserves, for example, would 
be withdrawn to keep their marginal narrow liquidity services 
yield from falling below the interest opportunity cost 
represented by the federal funds rate target. If the transaction 
demand for reserves disappeared completely, the Fed would 
end up withdrawing all bank reserves in defense of its federal 
funds rate target and lose its power to influence market interest 
rates. It is difficult to say what would happen next. Suffice it to 
say that economists and central bankers have reason to be 
concerned about this possibility. 
However, the Fed’s leverage over interest rates would be 
completely secure if it switched to the interest-on-reserves 
regime described above. Instead of withdrawing the monetary 
base, the central bank could let banks accumulate the unneeded 
currency and reserves. Banks could exchange currency for 
reserve balances earning the policy rate, which would also equal 
the market rate of interest. The aggregate quantity of reserves 
held by banks would be determined by the central bank’s 
reserve target. Banks would regard deposits at the central bank 
as government debt with a floating daily market rate of interest 
and value them as such. Such developments would not 
interfere at all with the central bank’s power to implement 
interest rate policy in an interest-on-reserves regime.15 
I conclude that the threat to interest rate policy from the 
shrinkage or disappearance of the transaction demand for the 
monetary base is a consequence of the operating procedures 
that a central bank chooses to use. A central bank’s leverage 
over interest rates is fundamentally secure as long as it utilizes 
the interest-on-reserves regime, which does not require open 
market operations to maintain a scarcity of reserves relative to 
their demand so as to support a positive interest opportunity 
cost of reserves. 
IV. Financing Interest on Reserves
Paying interest on reserves would seem to be expensive from 
the Treasury’s point of view. Interest earnings ordinarily 
transferred by a central bank as tax revenue to the Treasury 
would be diverted to pay interest on reserves. Moreover, the 
payment of interest on reserves would induce banks to enlarge 
substantially the quantity of reserves demanded, greatly 
enlarging the interest that a central bank would have to pay. 
This section addresses the financing of interest on reserves, and 
argues that the fiscal implications are likely to be more 
favorable than might be supposed. 
Implementing an interest-on-reserves regime has two 
effects on government finances. First, there is an effect due to 
the increase in reserve deposits and assets acquired by a central 
bank as a result of the regime change. Second, there is an effect 
due to the payment of interest on preexisting reserve deposits. 
I consider these in turn. 
Suppose a central bank such as the Fed confines its asset 
purchases mainly to Treasury securities. In that case, interest 
on the increase in reserves will be self-financing if there is a 
positive spread between longer term Treasury securities and 
the rate of interest on reserves. Reserve balances at the central 
bank paying market interest are like one-day Treasury 
securities. Hence, interest rate spreads between longer term 
Treasury securities and overnight deposits at the central bank 
should exhibit term premia ordinarily reflected in the Treasury 
yield curve. Therefore, a central bank such as the Fed should be 
able to self-finance interest on the enlarged demand for 
reserves in the new regime. In fact, the net interest spread 
earned on new assets acquired in the interest-on-reserves 
regime would raise additional revenue for the central bank.16
What about the effect on the government’s finances of 
paying interest on preexisting reserve holdings? Paying a 
market rate of interest on reserves held previously would 
reduce transfers from the central bank to the Treasury because 
it would eliminate the tax on preexisting reserves. That said, 
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and banks are likely to economize further on reserves if they 
continue to earn no interest. Moreover, net interest earned by 
expanding the central bank’s balance sheet could offset, or 
more than offset, these losses. At most, switching to the 
interest-on-reserves regime would have a relatively small 
adverse effect on government finances and could very well 
increase central bank transfers to the Treasury. 
Paying a market rate of interest on reserves could create cash 
flow problems for a central bank. One problem is that interest 
on reserves would be paid on a daily basis, but interest earnings 
would not accrue on a daily basis. Interest on short-term 
securities is paid on a discount basis rather than on a daily basis 
and interest on longer term securities is paid at infrequent 
intervals. Also, inevitably there will be periods in which the 
yield curve slopes downward, perhaps because the central bank 
had recently tightened policy and markets expect a return to 
lower overnight interest rates in the future. In such periods, 
interest on the central bank’s portfolio could conceivably fail to 
cover interest on reserves. 
Cash flow problems could be addressed in a number of 
ways. A central bank with sizable earnings on assets acquired 
with non-interest-bearing currency could utilize those net 
interest earnings to help pay interest on reserves. If necessary, a 
central bank could draw down its capital to help pay interest on 
reserves, replenishing its capital when cash flows are positive. If 
a central bank held Treasury securities, modifications could be 
made in the timing of interest payments from the Treasury 
once its securities were acquired by the central bank. These 
important operational issues must be addressed before the 
interest-on-reserves regime could be implemented. On the 
whole, however, cash flow problems would be manageable. 
V. Conclusion
Open market operations are neither necessary nor sufficient to 
implement interest rate policy. These operations are not 
necessary because they work by restricting the supply of 
reserves in order to maintain a positive marginal liquidity 
services yield and an interest opportunity cost of reserves. By 
paying and varying interest on reserves, a central bank could 
exert leverage over market rates without maintaining an 
interest opportunity cost spread. Open market operations are 
not sufficient to implement interest rate policy either, because 
they govern only the interest opportunity cost spread. The level 
of the interbank rate is determined only if, in addition, the rate 
of interest paid on reserves is specified at zero or otherwise.
This unorthodox way of viewing monetary policy operating 
procedures is entirely consistent with conventional monetary 
theory. The change of perspective, however, enables us to 
better appreciate the potential role of interest on reserves for 
monetary policy. The main practical point of this paper is that 
a central bank can implement interest rate policy by paying and 
varying interest on reserves without maintaining an interest 
opportunity cost spread as long as the preexisting supply of 
bank reserves is large enough to keep the interbank rate pressed 
down to the interest-on-reserves floor. 
The interest-on-reserves regime has four attractive features. 
First, the regime would make full use of two monetary policy 
instruments—open market operations and interest on 
reserves—to enable a central bank to simultaneously pursue 
interest rate policy and an independent objective for aggregate 
bank reserves. That would potentially improve on the Fed’s 
current operating procedures that obligate bank reserves to 
support interest rate policy. Bank reserves could be varied to 
offset shocks to the private supply of broad liquidity in 
financial markets in the interest-on-reserves regime, while 
interest rate policy could be used to stabilize the overall 
macroeconomy. 
Second, the interest-on-reserves regime would perfectly 
preserve a central bank’s leverage over interest rates, even in the 
unlikely event that the transaction demand for base money 
disappeared entirely in the future. Moreover, banks would have 
no incentive to avoid central bank reserves in such a regime. In 
contrast, the Fed’s current operating procedures might not fare 
well if the demand for reserves were to shrink further and 
would not work at all if the transaction demand for reserves 
were to disappear altogether. 
Third, the interest-on-reserves regime might very well be 
self-financing; it even has the potential to generate significant 
additional revenue for the government. At worst, switching to 
the interest-on-reserves regime would involve a relatively small 
adverse effect on government finances. Paying a market rate of 
interest on reserves could create cash flow problems for a 
central bank; but these problems would be manageable.
Finally, the interest-on-reserves regime would eliminate 
entirely distortions in financial markets due to the tax on 
reserves. Banks would save resources that had been devoted to 
economizing on reserves. An abundance of costless, safe 
reserves would substitute somewhat for the costly and risky 
extension of private credit in the process of making payments. 
The shrinkage of private credit in making payments, in turn, 
would help a central bank to limit the extension of its own 
credit in support of the payments system. Endnotes
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1. See Friedman (1999) and the various papers in Posen (2000). 
2. See Meyer (2001). 
3. For instance, Woodford (2000) analyzes the channel system of 
interest rate control and compares it with the Fed’s current operating 
procedures. See Borio (1997) for a survey. 
4. See also Fama (1983) and Hall (1983). 
5. A few economists have discussed the use of interest on reserves as a 
policy instrument. Hall (1983, 1999) shows how interest on reserves 
could be utilized to control the price level. Goodhart (2000) and 
Woodford (1999) discuss how interest on reserves could be utilized to 
implement monetary policy in a world without money. Interest on 
deposits at the central bank is also an important component of the 
channel system for implementing monetary policy. 
6. See Sargent and Wallace (1985) and Smith (1991). 
7. See, for example, Kerr and King (1996), McCallum (2001), and 
Woodford (1999). 
8. See Goodfriend (2000). 
9. A concise statement such as this does not actually appear in the 
book. The point is made through a series of examples. See Fisher 
(1930, pp. 186-94). 
10. See Bernanke and Gertler (1995). 
11. Economists have recently begun to analyze the role and 
management of broad liquidity in the economy. For instance, Aiyagari 
and McGrattan (1998), Heaton and Lucas (1996), and Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1998) analyze broad liquidity and consider how much the 
government should supplement the private supply of broad liquidity 
with a floating stock of government debt. 
12. Economists such as Poole (1970) recognized that a central bank 
could pursue a combination policy involving both bank reserves and 
the interest rate. A combination policy can be interpreted as a rule that 
uses a weighted average of reserves and the interest rate as the policy 
instrument. In the conventional analysis, however, no interest is paid 
on reserves and the two instruments cannot be chosen independently 
of each other. 
13. For instance, the recent introduction of sweep accounts greatly 
reduced required reserves in the United States. 
14. Friedman (1999) and King (1999) regard such an outcome as a real 
possibility. 
15. Goodhart (2000, part 3) and Woodford (1999, pp. 72-5; 2000, 
p. 255) reach a similar conclusion. 
16. Note that the liquidity spread would tend to shrink as the supply 
of reserves increased. References
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